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Department of Philosophy
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mathematics, and (3) the character of necessity of mathematical truth.

In Wittgenstein's speculation the transition from the philosophical
point of view expressed in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to the
later development of his thought, as it is reflected in the Philosophical
investigations and On certainty, is relevant also to his conception of
mathematics.

The transition from the claim, "The propositions of logic
are tautologies," to the remark, "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental," is significant.

In particular, while in the Tractatus, mathematics is not given an
account of its own, independent of the account which is given to logic,
the Rel1Ulrks on the foundations of I1Ulthel1Ultics seems to offer sufficient evidence for the belief that, in the late stage of Wittgenstein's
speculation, the analysis of the foundations of mathematics received an
explicit treatment on its own.

In the following passage, both the link and the differentiation between logic and mathematics can be found.
The assertion that "Mathematics is a logical method" defines the link, but already suggests a differentiation. "The
propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore
pseUdo-propositions" specifies the difference, without denying kinship.

This discussion is concerned with the attempt to illustrate the
transformation which occurred in Wittgenstein's way of conceiving
mathematics; that is to say, with the passage from the original idea of
mathematics as a discipline, on a par with logic itself, reflecting the unmodifiable, and therefore necessary, features of the logical structure of
the world, to the more "intuitionistic" conception of mathematics, as a
constructive activity, leading to merely conventional truths.

Logical propositions cannot be regarded as standardly
meaningful propositions, such as those of the natural sciences.
The characterization of logical propositions as tautologies, i. e.,
as propositions which say nothing because of their being
"unconditionally true," and therefore, such as to admit "all
possible situations," attributes to them "a unique status
among all propositions" (Wittgenstein, 1922:69 and 121).

The different connotations of the notion of "truth," in relation
to these two different conceptions of mathematics, are also considered.
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The purpose of this paper is to sketch some features of
the development and transformation ofWittgenstein's account
of mathematics and mathematical truth from his first work
(Wittgenstein, 1922) to the later development of his thought
(Wittgenstein, 1956).

The truth-table method that allows the determination of
the truth-value of complex propositions through knowledge
of the truth-values of the elementary propositions with which
they are constructed (Wittgenstein, 1922:73), and therefore
theoretically succeeds in reducing the question of the truthvalue of propositions to the empirically verifiable correspondence between states of affairs, actually existing in the world,
and elementary propositions picturing them, brings into evidence the peculiarity of tautologies as propositions always
true, regardless of the truth-values of their truth-functional
components (Wittgenstein, 1922:69 and 121).

Let us start directly in outlining those main features of
Wittgenstein's early conception of mathematics in such a way
that, in the end, we will have the ground that we need for the
comparison with the later view.
Three aspects will be addressed: (1) the form of mathematical propositions, (2) the relation between logic and
85
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What about mathematical propositions? They are not
tautologies, since they are not discovered to be "unconditionally true" independently of the truth of their truthfunctional components. The peculiarity that makes them
pseudo-propositions is, as in the case of logical propositions, a
certain lacking of any "content." There is nothing comparable
to what the pictured state of affairs represents for a proposition of the natural sciences.
The assertion that "A proposition of mathematics does
not express a thought" (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133) is a denial of
any representational content in a mathematical proposition.
Since "A thought is a proposition with a sense" (Wittgenstein,
1922:35) and "A proposition [it can be presupposed that here
Wittgenstein was thinking of a 'proposition with a sense']
is a picture of reality" (Wittgenstein, 1922:39), and since
"Instead of 'This proposition has such and such a sense' we
can simply say 'This proposition represents such and such
situation'" (Wittgenstein, 1922:43), it follows that a mathematical proposition does not represent any situation, i.e., is
not a picture of reality.
This lack of a "sinn" of mathematical propositions is
shown in their form itself, since, because they are equations,
they are pseUdo-propositions (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133).
Before advancing the analysis of the form of the equation, a too hastily formed conclusion that could be derived
from the account of the senselessness of mathematical, and
more generally, logical propositions, namely their absolute
meaninglessness or uselessness is questioned.
It is essential to stress that for Wittgenstein to say that
logical and mathematical propositions have no sense (they are
"sinnlos") is not the same as saying that they are nonsensical
("unsinnig'); as clearly stated in the propositions above mentioned, "sinn" is had only by propositions of natural sciences.
The fact that logical and mathematical propositions lack it
does not suffice to make them "unsinnig"-as for example
philosophical propositions are (Wittgenstein, 1922:37).

This relevant difference cannot be justified unless the
denial of sense of logical and mathematical propositions is not
meant as equivalent to a denial of relevance or worth. Logical
and mathematical propositions are not queer mixtures of signs;
on the contrary, they perform the role of showing the logical
structure of the world: "The logic of the world, which is
shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in
equations by mathematics" (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133).
Therefore, in order to explain both their emptiness and
their function, it could be said that they have not a subject
matter in the way in which empirical propositions do (Wittgenstein, 1922: 129), or that the relation between a logical propo-

sition and what is shown by it is different from the relation
between empirical propositions and their subject matter.
Empirical propositions picture their subject matter;
logical propositions show what only improperly can be called
their subject matter, "the logic of the world."
Hence, the "unique status" of logical and mathematical
propositions is not due merely to lack of sense or to a difference of subject matter in comparison with empirical propositions; rather, their status can be understood only by taking
into consideration how these two types of propositions refer
to the world, and this is primarily reflected in their form.
Mathematical propositions are all of the form a=a, or a=b.
But, it is not the case that the supposed identity of reference
of the two expressions on the two sides of the equality is
asserted by the equation. Rather, the contrary is true: The
equation can be written because of the already known identity of the two expressions (Wittgenstein, 1922: 135 and 134).
What is stated, by asserting the identity of the two signs/
symbols or expressions, is their capability of being substituted
for one another. Therefore, for this reason, equations are in a
certain way superfluous: " ... the essential point about an
equation is that it is not necessary in order to show that the
two expressions connected by the sign of equality have the
same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves" (Wittgenstein, 1922:133).
The sign of identity cannot establish or produce the
equivalence of the two expressions it unites, but on the contrary only because the two expressions have already been
known to be equivalent, can the sign of identity be employed.
It really seems that there are only two alternatives with
regard to the use of this sign: either it can be eliminated from
our language (Wittgenstein, 1922:105), because the identity
or the difference of objects is to be resolved by the mere
identity or difference of signs denoting the objects, or its
relevance has to be seen not in its power of equating two
different expressions-since, were the equivalence of the two
expressions not yet known, the sign of identity itself could
not be used - but in being the instrument through which some,
in a certain way useful, transitions from a set of expressions
to another set of different expressions can be performed.

Being an equation is not something accidental for mathematical propositions: "It is the essential characteristic of
mathematical method that it employs equations" (Wittgenstein, 1922:135).
Thus, mathematical propositions fall under the second of
the possible alternatives. They have a function which requires
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their being equations. And since the legitimate use of the sign
of identity is subsequent to the actual equivalence of the expressions, mathematical propositions, according to Wittgenstein, are not only true, but obviously true.
Similarly, as already mentioned, logical propositions are
"unconditionally true."

cannot be interpreted as a relation of mere inclusion
of the second in the first, as a logicist reading of the
first work (Wittgenstein, 1922) would suggest: some
difference between the two is stressed and the common characteristic of showing the logical structure of
the world is asserted in a rather vague way.
Let us come back now to the main aim of this exposition.

Neither in logic nor in mathematics is any mistake or unexpected discovery possible (Wittgenstein, 1922:95, 133,
and 129).

It should be clear enough at this point why Wittgenstein's

Their validity a priori is connected with the capability of
conceiving a world: "What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought" (Wittgenstein, 1922:95).

If that account of mathematics is examined, the idea of a
presupposed relation of kinship linking logic and mathematics is easily envisioned. One of the essential features that
distinguishes this relation is the a priori necessary truth of this
set of propositions.

In summary, mathematical and logical propositions are
similar in the following respects: (1) they share the feature of
being different from the propositions of natural science:
neither mathematical nor logical propositions picture facts;
(2) they both show the logical structure of the world; and (3)
they are either "obviously" or "unconditionally" true.
On the other hand, they are different in two says: (1)
mathematical propositions are equations and not tautologies,
and (2) their peculiar function is to allow the transition from a
set of expressions not belonging to mathematics to another set
of expressions not belonging to mathematics.
In this paper the early view Wittgenstein (1922) held
on mathematics will not be criticized. The purpose, rather,
is to outline a comparison between his earlier and later positions.
Nonetheless, some directions along which a critical analysis would be developed are mentioned:
1.

The characterization of mathematical truths as equations always obviously true does not seem to cover
the whole field of mathematically true propositions.

2.

The account of identity, which constitutes the basis
of the early theory of mathematics, leaves unsolved
the problem of the status of identity itself: its not
being "an essential constituent of conceptual notation," if can be understood with regard to the objects,
whose difference or equality might be solved through
a less rich and various use of signs, seems to be compatible with an account of mathematics as constituted
only of propositions employing the sign of identity,
only on the basis of the assumption of an eventual
total superfluity of mathematics itself.

3.

Finally, the relation between logic and mathematics

early conception of mathematics (1922) is characterized as a
"mathematics of necessity."

Furthermore, their necessity wholly derives from their
peculiar link to the world, i.e., their lacking any pictorial connection with states of affairs, and their showing the logical
structure of the world.
What then is Wittgenstein's (1956) account of mathematical propositions, of their form, of their relation to logic, and
finally of their truth in the later development?
First, there is no explicit restriction of mathematical
propositions to equations, but despite this the points of contact seem numerous: the examples of mathematical propositions are generally equations, the discussion related to the
notion of "calculations" is developed through the presentation
of equations, and the discussion of the concept of "proof"
relies again on inferences whose steps are justified on the basis
of the equivalence of the various lines.
Furthermore, mathematical propositions are used for the
transition from sets of true propositions to different sets of
true propositions.
Yet despite these similarities with the early writing (Wittgenstein, 1922), the fact that no restriction on the form of
mathematical propositions is given is not wholly irrelevant:
mathematics is "a MOTLEY of techniques of proof," and in
addition is regarded as not being "a sharply delimited concept"(Wittgenstein, 1956:84eand 155e).
Perhaps Wittgenstein was still convinced of the possibility of reducing all mathematical truths to the form of
equation, but it seems that his first concern was to give the
most general and comprehensive account of all the various
branches of this "science" ("bird's eye view"), rather than to
synthesize most of its features into a small number of characterizations ("the general form of the proposition").
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Let us now consider in the second work, what in the first
seemed to be the central point ofWittgenstein's conception of
mathematics, namely its relation to logic.

What is then the root of cogency with which mathematical proofs, calculations, and measurements convince us of the
truth of their results?

First, the differentiation of logical and mathematical
propositions from empirical propositions remains, though the
grounds of the difference have changed. Wittgenstein's approach to this topic was on the line of an epistemological
analysis, i e., he considered the different quality of the certainty that distinguishes our conviction of a mathematical
truth from our conviction of an empirical truth.

The analysis of logical inference reveals both similarity
and difference between Wittgenstein's early (1922) and late
(1956) points of view.

The inexorability of mathematical and logical inferences,
the way that we do not even imagine to call in question the
certainty of their conclusions, is peculiar to them, strictly connected with their function in our life, and independent of experience. This, on the contrary, supports the truth of those
empirical propositions we regard as true (Wittgenstein, 1956:
24e and 27e): "Why are the Newtonian laws not axioms of
mathematics? Because we could quite well imagine things being
otherwise.... A proposition which it is supposed to be possible to imagine as other than true has a different function from
one for which this does not hold" (Wittgenstein, 1956: l14e).
Through the discussion of "experiment" and repeated
assertion that the result of each mathematical proof is not
unexpected, Wittgenstein stressed the "fundamental difference, together with an apparent similarity, between the roles
of an arithmetical proposition and an empirical proposition"
(Wittgenstein, 1956:32e).
In effect, form and empirical content are not features that
characterize propositions as empirical or non-empirical (Wittgenstein, 1956:13e and 75e).
Calculation, the main mathematical activity with which
Wittgenstein dealt, is not an experiment when it is normally
performed: there is no expectancy of unpredictable results.
Yet there may be a situation in which the same expressions
that in a normal activity of calculating are mathematical expressions can turn into the steps of an experiment. The analogy with the action of "lighting the stove in the morning"
seems very enlightening. Indeed this action is surely performed, under normal circumstances, with a specific purpose,
but nothing in the action itself can forbid the performance of
this same action for an experiment. Analogously, calculation
is normally one of the mathematical activities performed with
propositions, whose characteristic is that of following certain
rules in such a way that nothing unexpected, uncertain, or
ambiguous can result. But, nothing in the propositions rules
out the possibility of using them with the aim of performing
an experiment, e.g., when "the teacher makes the pupil do a
calculation in order to see whether he can calculate" (Wittgenstein, 1956:95e, 97e, 98e, and 9ge).

In fact, if on one side mathematics and logic are still
regarded as fields of linguistic expression in which absolute
certainty, "peculiar solidity," and "unassailable position,"
are warranted, on the other side is a severe criticism of the
justification of these characteristics in terms of any metaphysical correspondence with a mysterious structure, essence, or
truth in reality (Wittgenstein, 1956:5e and 47e).
In particular, Wittgenstein denied the myth present in his
first account, namely that "logic is a kind of ultra-physics, the
description of the 'logical structure' of the world, which we
perceive through a kind of ultra-experience."
In opposition to the theory of logic as "showing" the
necessary a priori structure of the world, and analogously to
the theory of logic as "grammar," i.e., as the set of rules of
every language-game connected to a form of life (Wittgenstein,
1968), in his late account the explanation of the cogency of
logical inferences, through which mathematical truths are
derived, is the function that our use of these expressions gave
to them.
The starting point is the acknowledgment of mathematics
as one of the many activities of our life and only from the
peculiar role it has in our life, does the necessity of logical
inferences derive (Wittgenstein, 1956:3e and 37e).
Therefore, the "hardness of the logical must" is wholly
dependent upon our conventional, agreed conception of what
line logical thinking should follow; the "inexorability" of logic
is nothing but the actual fact that we are inexorable in applying these laws. And this is only because, in our activities, this
particular way of inferring, counting, and calculating resulted
to be the most useful, and the fittest to our practical purposes
(Wittgenstein, 1956:35e, 37e, and I07e).
A calculation procedure that always gave different results
in different situations or repetitions of the same calculi, would
be of less use in our life.
With the shifting of the foundations of logic and correctness of inferring from the ideal correspondence with the structure of the world to our practical obedience to the logical
rules, the notions of truth and of right and wrong change
deeply: "But is this counting only a use, then; isn't there also
some truth corresponding to this sequence?" "The truth is
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that counting has proved to pay" "and of course there is such
a thing as right and wrong in passing from one measure to the
other; but what is the reality that 'right' accords with here?
Presumably a convention, or a use, and perhaps our practical
requirements" (Wittgenstein, 1956:3-4e and 6e).
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics is much
less simple than it could seem at first sight. In fact, if in a
certain sense it may seem that any sort of foundation of
mathematical truth relies on actual use of mathematical procedures, and that in turn the only root of their correctness is
previous conventional agreement on this use itself, such that
a different historical development could have produced a
different set of mathematical truths and procedures, on the
other side such a wholly and merely "conventionalistic" interpretation of Wittgenstein's later point of view should not
be supported.

In fact, Wittgenstein's appeal to convention and use as the
grounds for logical and mathematical necessity is quite explicit, but Wittgenstein's notion of convention, contrary to
Dummet's (I966) reading of it, is not the result of either a
subjective or an arbitrary decision. Convention is not an abstract and theoretical choice of some rules as those which we
agree to follow before starting the game. The convention, the
use from which the rules of our language-game derive, are
actually produced within the form of life in which that language-game is employed. The influence that the form of life

exerts on the prevalence of one or the other rule is a determining factor.
Nonetheless, there still remains a certain obscurity in
some of Wittgenstein's remarks as for the process of production of this convention itself. The problem is that of understanding whether the pragmatic and behavioristic foundation
of all linguistic activities was able, in Wittgenstein's account,
to justify thoroughly the actual working of language. That is,
through the new notions of "form of life" and "languagegame" did he really succeed in ruling out any appeal to supposedly deeper, undefinable roots of our agreement on what
we call "logical truth"?
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